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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
Pereira, Anil L. Ph.D., Department of Computer Science and Engineering, Wright State 
University, 2007. Role-based Access Control for Grid Data Resources in the Open Grid 
Services Architecture - Data Access and Integration (OGSA-DAI). 
 
 
 
 
Grid has emerged recently as an integration infrastructure for the sharing and 
coordinated use of diverse resources in dynamic, distributed virtual organizations (VOs). 
A Data Grid is an architecture for the access, exchange, and sharing of data in the Grid 
environment. In this dissertation, role-based access control (RBAC) systems for 
heterogeneous data resources in Data Grid systems are proposed. The Open Grid Services 
Architecture - Data Access and Integration (OGSA-DAI) is a widely used framework for 
the integration of heterogeneous data resources in Grid systems.  
However, in the OGSA-DAI system, access control causes substantial 
administration overhead for resource providers in VOs because each of them has to 
manage the authorization information for individual Grid users. Its identity-based access 
control mechanisms are severely inefficient and too complicated to manage because the 
direct mapping between users and privileges is transitory. To solve this problem, (1) the 
Community Authorization Service (CAS), provided by the Globus toolkit, and (2) the 
Shibboleth, an attribute authorization service, are used to support RBAC in the OGSA-
DAI system. The Globus Toolkit is widely used software for building Grid systems.  
Access control policies need to be specified and managed across multiple VOs. For 
this purpose, the Core and Hierarchical RBAC profile of the eXtensible Access Control 
 
 
iv
Markup Language (XACML) is used; and for distributed administration of those policies, 
the Object, Metadata and Artifacts Registry (OMAR) is used. OMAR is based on the e-
business eXtensible Markup Language (ebXML) registry specifications developed to 
achieve interoperable registries and repositories.  
The RBAC systems allow quick and easy deployments, privacy protection, and the 
centralized and distributed management of privileges. They support scalable, 
interoperable and fine-grain access control services; dynamic delegation of rights; and 
user-role assignments. They also reduce the administration overheads for resource 
providers because they need to maintain only the mapping information from VO roles to 
local database roles. Resource providers maintain the ultimate authority over their 
resources. Moreover, unnecessary mapping and connections can be avoided by denying 
invalid requests at the VO level. Performance analysis shows that our RBAC systems add 
only a small overhead to the existing security infrastructure of OGSA-DAI. 
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Chapter 1  
 
Introduction 
 
1.1 Data Grid 
Grid has emerged recently as an integration infrastructure for the sharing and 
coordinated use of diverse resources in dynamic, distributed virtual organizations (VOs). 
A Data Grid is an architecture for the access, exchange, and sharing of data in the Grid 
environment. It provides a distributed system middleware that allows different 
communities to access and share data, networks, and other resources in a controlled and 
secure manner [1]. Data Grids facilitate the management of distributed heterogeneous 
data. The burden of managing the operations is removed from the user. The collective 
operations required are all managed by the system via a single sign-on and uniform 
querying mechanism for the user. The motivation behind such a system is to address the 
following considerations [2]: (1) Large data set size, geographic distribution of users and 
resources, and computationally intensive analysis results in complex and stringent 
performance demands that are not satisfied by any existing data management 
infrastructure; (2) No integrating architecture exists that allows us to identify 
requirements and components common to different systems and hence apply different 
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technologies in a coordinated fashion to a range of data-intensive large-scale application 
domains. Current technology cannot easily handle these scenarios which require the 
coordinated sharing of data and resources across multiple organizations. It either does not 
accommodate the range of resource types or does not provide the flexibility and control 
on sharing relationships [3].  
 
Scientific and Business communities are increasingly collaborating, and this is 
giving rise to the need for more sophisticated technologies for data and resource sharing. 
Data Grids reduce hardware and software costs by enabling the secure exchange of 
programs and data between collaborating organizations. Without a Data Grid, a separate 
set of resources are purchased (and managed) in a demilitarized zone (DMZ) behind a 
completely separate firewall. By using Data Grid technology, there is no need to build a 
separate DMZ [4]. 
 
1.2 Motivation 
User authorization is one of the most challenging issues in Data Grids. Current 
authorization mechanisms cannot address all the issues that arise in dynamic Grid 
environments which often encompass multiple organizations, each with its own security 
policy [5]. Traditional means of security administration that involves manual editing of 
policy databases or issuance of credentials cannot meet the demands of these dynamic 
scenarios [6]. There will be a profound impact on the security of distributed systems by 
using a Data Grid system. In traditional systems, the focus of security mechanisms has 
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been to protect the system from its users and, in turn, to protect data maintained by the 
system on behalf of each user. While such protection remains important for Data Grid 
applications, Data Grids introduce the extra requirements of protecting applications and 
user data from the systems on which parts of an application will execute [7]. Also, 
traditional network security research has focused primarily on two-party client-server 
interactions with relatively low performance requirements. Data Grid applications 
frequently involve many more entities, impose stringent performance requirements and 
involve more complex activities, such as collective operations and the downloading of 
code [8]. 
 
The typical identity-based authorization used in Grids today is not scalable because 
authorization information should be maintained for each user. In role-based access 
control (RBAC) [9, 10] permissions are associated with roles, and users are assigned 
appropriate roles, thereby acquiring the roles permissions [11]. Hence, RBAC is quite 
scalable since authorization information is associated with roles, not with individual 
users. RBAC shows clear advantages over traditional access control models in Grid 
environments, because it allows a uniform representation of diverse security policies and 
ensures that no security violations occur during inter-domain accesses [5]. None of the 
current access control systems in Grids provide comprehensive support for RBAC. 
 
The Data Access and Integration Services Working Group (DAIS-WG) of the 
Global Grid Forum (GGF) established standards for Grid interface to data resources [12]. 
The Open Grid Services Architecture - Data Access and Integration (OGSA-DAI) [13] 
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provides the first implementation for these standards. OGSA-DAI is a middleware 
infrastructure for accessing and controlling data sources and sinks. Though OGSA-DAI is 
widely used, its access control mechanisms are not scalable and cause substantial 
overhead for resource providers in VOs because each of them has to manage a role-map 
file containing authorization information for individual Grid users. 
 
The Community Authorization Service (CAS) [14] and the Shibboleth [15] are 
authorization services that have several advantages over other authorization services used 
in Grids, and they both use the Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) [16] 
standard. None of the other authorization services in Grids use a standard format to 
express authorization assertions. CAS records user groups and their permissions on 
resources, and it targets access control for computational and file-based storage 
resources. CAS is part of the Globus Toolkit [8]. The Globus Toolkit provides a set of 
basic services to establish a Grid system and it has a wide support base in the Grid 
community. Shibboleth is designed to provide user attributes to requesting resources and 
it targets access control for internet based resources. Shibboleth has a wide support base 
in the Internet2 community. SAML is used to express authentication and authorization 
assertions between different security domains. 
  
1.3 Contribution 
In this dissertation two RBAC systems for heterogeneous data resources in Data 
Grids are proposed. The first system uses CAS as the main building block. This system is 
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scalable in terms of the number of users and VOs; it can be quickly and easily deployed; 
and it provides centralized privilege management and delegation via roles. The second 
system uses Shibboleth as its main building block. This system is scalable in terms of the 
number of access requests in addition to the number of users and VOs; it is robust as 
there is no single point of failure; it supports the distributed management of privileges 
and fine-grain attribute release policy; and it provides privacy protection for users, in 
addition to dynamic delegation via roles. We also use the Core and Hierarchical RBAC 
profile of the eXtensible Access Control Markup Language (XACML) [17] to specify 
access control policies for multiple VOs. XACML is a standard of the Organization for 
the Advancement of Structured Information Standards (OASIS) for describing access 
control policies uniformly across different security domains [18]. The Core and 
Hierarchical RBAC profile of XACML defines how the ANSI core and hierarchical 
RBAC standard [19] can be specified in XACML. For the distributed storage and 
administration of XACML policies, we propose the use of the Object, Metadata and 
Artifacts Registry (OMAR) which provides an implementation of the OASIS e-business 
eXtensible Markup Language (ebXML) registry specifications. The ebXML registry 
specifications are developed to achieve interoperable registries and repositories with an 
interface that enables submission, query and retrieval.  The main contributions of this 
dissertation are outlined as follows:  
• The RBAC systems will support a wide range of security policies using role-
privileges, role hierarchies, delegations, and constraints. It is shown how the CAS 
policy statements and SAML assertions can be used to support RBAC. The RBAC 
profile of XACML has several drawbacks for the access control in Grids. It does not 
 
 
6
address dynamic delegation of rights and dynamic user-role assignments. They are 
supported in our system by using OMAR. 
• With the proposed RBAC systems resource providers will have to maintain only the 
mapping information from VO roles to local roles and the local policies, thus the 
administration overhead is reduced. Furthermore, the resource providers can grant or 
refuse the access requests of specific users by maintaining their authorization 
information separately. This enables the resource providers to have the ultimate 
authority over their resources. Also, unnecessary authentication, mapping and 
connections can be avoided by denying invalid requests at the VO level. The access 
control systems can provide increased manageability for a large number of users and 
reduce day-to-day administration tasks of the resource providers, while they maintain 
the ultimate authority over their resources. 
• The integration of the systems with OGSA-DAI will bring several advantages (as 
noted above) into its authorization infrastructure. Enhancements have been proposed 
to the role-map files so that they can also contain mapping information from VO roles 
to local database roles, and local policy. This dramatically reduces the number of 
entries to be managed in the role-map files and updates to them need to be made far 
less frequently. The implementation on the client side has been extended to request 
and delegate policy assertions. The server-side has been extended to parse the policy 
assertions to obtain the VO roles. The server also verifies the capabilities associated 
with a VO role against the local policies of the resource provider and maps it to a 
local database role. The performance evaluation shows that not much extra time is 
required to set up the security contexts between clients and servers. 
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1.4 Outline of Dissertation 
The rest of the dissertation is structured as follows: Chapter 2 provides detailed 
background in terms of the major components used such as the Globus Toolkit, OGSA-
DAI, CAS and Shibboleth. We discuss the security issues related to these components 
and Data Grids in general. We explain the need for RBAC, and provide the required 
concepts and foundation for our research. Chapter 3 reviews our work of the RBAC 
system for Grid Databases using CAS and includes performance analysis of the system. 
Chapter 4 reviews our work of the RBAC system for Grid Databases using Shibboleth 
and also includes performance analysis of the system. Chapter 5 has some conclusions. 
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Chapter 2  
 
Background 
 
2.1 Existing Middleware for Data Grids 
Distributed data resources can be diverse in their formats, schema, quality, access 
mechanisms, ownership, access policies, capabilities, and authentication and 
authorization mechanisms. To efficiently manage these, a Data Grid needs technical 
solutions and standards for data discovery and access, data exploration and analysis, 
resource management, and security [1, 20, 21]. The Globus Toolkit [8] provides a set of 
basic services to establish a Grid system. The Open Grid Services Architecture  Data 
Access and Integration (OGSA-DAI) [13] is an existing middleware implementation that 
is widely used for the integration of heterogeneous data resources in Grid systems. 
 
2.1.1 Globus Toolkit 
The basic Grid middleware components provided by the Globus Toolkit are: (1) 
Grid Security Infrastructure (GSI): authentication and related security services; (2) 
Globus Resource Allocation Manager (GRAM): resource allocation and process 
management; (3) Meta Computing Directory Service (MDS): distributed access to the 
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structure and state information of a system; (4) Globus Executable Management (GEM): 
construction, caching and location of executables; (5) Global Access to Secondary 
Storage (GASS): remote access to data via sequential and parallel interfaces; (6) Nexus: 
unicast and multicast communication services; (7) Heart Beat Monitor (HBM): 
monitoring of the health and status of system components; and (8) General Purpose 
architecture for Reservation and Allocation (GARA): reservation of resources and 
monitoring of reservations. In addition to these components, the Globus Toolkit 
implements the Open Grid Service Architecture (OGSA). OGSA integrates Grid and 
Web services technologies and defines standard interfaces and behaviors for distributed 
system integration and management [1]. The toolkit has recently been aligned with the 
Web Services Resource Framework (WSRF) [22]. WSRF defines conventions for 
managing the state in distributed systems based on Web services. For each of these 
components, a C and/or Java Application Programming Interface (API) is available for 
developers [23].  
  
2.1.2 Open Grid Services Architecture  Data Access and 
Integration (OGSA-DAI) 
Grid integrates several communities of resource providers and resource consumers. 
This integration can be technically challenging because of the need to achieve various 
qualities of service when running on top of different native platforms. The Open Grid 
Services Architecture (OGSA) addresses these challenges and defines uniform exposed 
service semantics, the Grid Service [24]. Version 3 of the Globus Toolkit and its 
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accompanying Grid Security Infrastructure (GSI) provide the first implementation of 
OGSA mechanisms and cast security functions as OGSA services. This version of the 
Globus Toolkit also publishes service security policies and specifies standards for 
interoperability [7].  
 
Current research in the area of Grid databases is undertaken by Project Spitfire 
associated with the European Data Grid [25] and the Open Grid Services Architecture - 
Data Access and Integration (OGSA-DAI) [13]. Project Spitfire provides access control 
based on authorization tags specified within XML-based query files. These tags are 
mapped by a database resource to local roles via a role-database that it maintains. A 
drawback of their approach is that the role-database contains the mapping to local 
database roles for all Grid users that have access to that database resource. Multiple 
entries in multiple role-databases may need to be updated if new Grid users are allowed 
to access multiple data resources or if the access privileges of current users change.  
 
The Database Access and Integration Services Working Group (DAIS-WG) of the 
Global Grid Forum (GGF) is currently establishing the standards for Grid interface to 
data resources [12]. OGSA-DAI is a widely used middleware infrastructure, aligned with 
the GGFs OGSA vision, to facilitate uniform access to data resources using a service-
oriented architecture (SOA) [13]. OGSA-DAI provides activities to access relational, 
XML databases, and indexed files, etc. It also provides data translation and third-party 
delivery activities [13]. OGSA-DAI enables client applications to submit request 
documents in order to perform a set of tasks on a remote data resource.   
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OGSA-DAI provides a set of core activities that implement the basic functionality needed 
to interact with a data resource, and it is easy for users to add new activities that operate 
within the OGSA-DAI framework [26]. OGSA-DAI users can extend OGSA-DAI web 
services to expose their own data resources and to support application-specific 
functionality. OGSA-DAI also provides a consistent transactional framework and 
facilities to allow developers to add transactional behavior to their activities.  
 
OGSA-DAI has over 1100 registered users and projects which require continuously 
available data access and integration services [13]. OGSA-DAI is used by a number of 
large projects both within the US and UK to satisfy their data access and integration 
requirements. In addition to this, the OGSA-DAI project is working in close collaboration 
with other major Grid middleware providers, such as Globus, IBM and the UK Open 
Middleware Infrastructure Institute (OMII), to ensure that OGSA-DAI integrates 
seamlessly with their products.  
 
2.2 Issues for Access Control in Grids 
The overall direction for access control architectures in Grid computing is toward 
the need for leveraging IT infrastructure as it emerges. Integration with Web services and 
hosting environment technologies introduces opportunities to leverage emerging security 
standards and technologies such as the Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) 
[16] and Web Services Security (WSS) [27]. Participating organizations within a Grid 
often have significant investment in existing security mechanisms and infrastructure, and 
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Grid services could be built on sophisticated container-based hosting environments such 
as J2EE or .Net. Grid security mechanisms should interoperate with, rather than replace, 
those mechanisms [6]. Most security functionality should be placed in the hosting 
environments, so that application development will be simplified and security 
functionality can be upgraded independently of applications [6]. The WSS specifications 
address these issues. WSS is a standard mechanism for interoperability and enables the 
interaction between different platforms and security models. WSS standard can be used 
to transport credentials from a client to a server, such as the ones represented by SAML 
attribute assertions [28]. Users need globally defined names that are recognized at all 
sites they access. A users identity needs to be passed securely and transparently between 
sites as jobs progress [29]. Users must be able to access resources dynamically without 
any administrator intervention. These resources must be coordinated properly and must 
interact securely with other services. Thus, resources must have global identities, and 
they should be accessed without violating their local policies. 
 
Significant challenges remain for cross-domain auditing and privacy management 
[30]. An audit mechanism can be used to determine whether or not the access control 
policies have been administered properly. The audit mechanism is responsible for 
producing records which track security related events [31]. And, for this purpose, it is 
essential to keep a log of the access requests and the enforced security policies. In 
traditional systems, the audit mechanism is local to each server; however, on the Grid, 
either the audit mechanism should be distributed or the audit records should be 
transmitted to a location where a higher level view of the system can be constructed [32]. 
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Standards are required to facilitate the audit and to reconcile different audit trails that are 
distributed among different organizations. It is extremely difficult to browse the audit 
logs if they are in different formats and in different administrative domains. Also, the 
access control mechanism should be able to match the audit entries in different audit logs 
and administrative domains.  
 
Auditing also depends on authentication because audit records usually associate 
individuals with the actions they have taken, and the identity of the user must be 
determined if these entries are to be trusted [32]. The user identity can be used to identify 
the user who initiated the request. The request can be logged at the resource along with 
the mapping information and the subsequent actions performed. This information can be 
used to find patterns that fit the profile of a system intrusion or the activities that do not 
fit the profiles of legitimate users [32]. However this information could affect the privacy 
of users. For example, by examining the information logged at various sites with respect 
to users belonging to a particular research group, it is possible to infer their data access 
patterns and thus obtain information about their work. To solve this problem, a user could 
be issued a set of pseudonym identities [33] and he/she could access each site with a 
different identity in the set. The information that binds the set of pseudo identities to the 
user identity should be maintained securely and can be used when security violations 
occur.   
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2.3 Need for Role-Based Access Control for Grid Data 
Resources 
In Grids, both users and resources are dynamic. Furthermore, those users and 
resources may belong to multiple organizations with their own diverse security policies 
and mechanisms. Participating organizations may have different security models. It is 
important for these models to interoperate based on different levels of trust. Trust should 
be established not only among users and resources, but also among the resources 
themselves so that they can be coordinated. These trust domains can span across multiple 
organizations and must adapt dynamically as participants join or leave and resources are 
accessed or released [6]. Resource providers must understand and support the 
mechanisms and policies that are not strictly under their control.  
 
It is desirable to group users and resources that need to be coordinated towards a 
common goal into virtual organizations (VOs). The key requirement is to design access 
control mechanisms for these VOs, which can interoperate with existing local security 
infrastructures and allow resource providers to have the ultimate control over their 
resources. A VO spanning across multiple sites can use a single security mechanism, but 
usually it needs to accommodate multiple security mechanisms [29]. While 
acknowledging and respecting the site autonomy, there are a number of requirements to 
be met for Grid security, in order to achieve the goals of the VOs. 
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Supporting role-based access control (RBAC) [9, 10] is desirable in Grids. RBAC 
shows clear advantages over traditional discretionary and mandatory access control 
models in such environments, because it allows a uniform representation of diverse 
security policies and ensures that no security violations occur during inter-domain 
accesses [5]. In RBAC, permissions are associated with roles, and users are assigned 
appropriate roles, thereby acquiring the roles permissions [11]. In a VO with a large 
number of users, we could think of several groups of users, each with different levels of 
access (roles). A role has certain privileges associated with it. When a VO role is mapped 
to a local role, it will specify the privileges a user can have; for example, access to a 
specific table of a database. 
 
In VOs, users may be assigned specific tasks, and there may be constraints related 
to the execution of those tasks. For example, a user may have access to data only during 
certain days of the week, or certain tasks may be considered mutually exclusive for a 
user; i.e., any two or more tasks cannot be executed at the same time. RBAC can support 
a wide range of security policies using role-privileges, role hierarchies, and constraints. 
 
The typical identity-based authorization used today is not scalable because 
authorization information should be maintained for each user. In RBAC, authorization 
information is associated with roles, not with individual users. It has been shown that the 
cost of administering RBAC is proportional to U+P per role, while the cost of associating 
users directly with permissions is proportional to U×P, where U is the number of 
individuals in a role and P is the number of permissions required by the role [34, 35].  
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In certain instances, a user may wish to delegate only a subset of its rights to an 
application to act on its behalf. This requirement can usually arise in systems where a 
limited trust relationship is established between entities. For example, a user may contact 
a data mining service to mine certain data sets that the user has access to. If the trust 
between the user and the service is limited, then the user may want to delegate only a 
specific subset of its rights to the service, thus enabling it to complete only the required 
task and nothing more. With RBAC, such delegation could be done easily. For example, 
a user in a special role can delegate privileges to other roles. 
 
RBAC is distinguished by its inherent support for the Principle of Least Privilege 
[30], which requires that a user be given no more privileges than necessary to perform a 
job [9]. It can be easily enforced by first identifying the roles in an organization correctly 
and then assigning only those privileges to each role that allow the role members to 
perform their tasks. Users can request a particular role among those they are entitled to 
and, hence, gain the specific permissions tied with that role. Furthermore, current RBAC 
models are modular and can thus incorporate sophisticated functionality such as RBAC 
policy administration. Also, more complex forms of access control, such as task-based 
access control (TBAC), can be layered on RBAC [10]. 
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2.4 Drawbacks of the Access Control Mechanisms in 
OGSA-DAI 
To date, most work on data storage, access and transfer on the Grid has focused on 
files [36], but the Grid can also be used to integrate various distributed heterogeneous 
databases and supports query/transaction processing on them through a uniform interface 
[36, 37]. The use of databases in Data Grids presents different security needs and access 
policies compared with the use of computational resources. For example, certain 
applications may be authorized to access only certain parts of the information in a 
database during a specific time interval. OGSA-DAI uses Access Control Lists (ACLs) 
for user authorization.  
 
OGSA-DAI supports access control via an ACL held in a role-map file that maps 
individual Grid users to local database usernames and passwords. In this case, each 
resource provider has to maintain a role-map file to authorize access to its resources. This 
access control method is not suitable for VOs, especially in terms of scalability, because 
both users and resources are dynamic in VOs. Multiple entries in multiple role-map files 
may need to be updated if new users are allowed to access multiple data resources or if 
the access privileges of current users change, which is not unusual in Data Grids. This 
puts an unnecessary burden on the resource providers in managing the role-map files, 
especially when both the users and resource providers belong to multiple VOs. 
Furthermore, there are unnecessary overheads on the server side whenever users make 
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invalid requests. This is because users are authenticated, mapped and connected without 
first verifying their requests against their access privileges.  
 
2.5 Incorporation of Existing Authorization Services in 
Data Grids 
None of the current access control systems in Grids provide comprehensive support 
for RBAC. We will use the Community Authorization Service (CAS) and Shibboleth 
(along with the GridShib interface) to support RBAC in OGSA-DAI, as described later in 
Chapters 3 and 4. CAS and Shibboleth services have certain advantages over other 
authorization services for Grids, such as the Virtual Organization Management Service 
(VOMS) [38] and Akenti [39]. VOMS authorization assertions do not provide rights 
directly, and they need to be interpreted by the resource. As far as Akenti is concerned, it 
is targeted on authorizing accesses to web resources and particularly websites, so it is not 
adequate for VOs [38]. Akenti does not provide support for dynamic delegation [40]. 
Delegation is a key issue in a VO, wherein a set of rights can be delegated to a program 
for it to act on behalf of a user. A program should also be able to delegate some of its 
rights to other programs [3].  
 
PERMIS [40] is an attribute-based authorization service, and so is VOMS. They 
use assertions that bind the attributes to users for authorization, as opposed to the typical 
identity-based authorization used today [28]. However, currently they do not support any 
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standard for how attributes are transferred from the attribute authority to the Grid services 
and no standard is used for expressing the policy regarding those attributes [28].  
 
SAML can be used to express authorization queries, and Extensible Access Control 
Markup Language (XACML) [18] can be used to express authorization policy statements. 
Except CAS and Shibboleth, which use the SAML standard, none of the other 
authorization services use a standard format to express authorization assertions. SAML is 
used to uniformly express the authentication and authorization assertions between 
different security domains. These assertions could contain the following three types of 
statements: (1) Authentication statements which assert that the user has been 
authenticated by the authorization service; (2) Attribute statements which can express the 
attributes of the user such as institutional affiliation, group membership, and so on; (3) 
Authorization decision statements which can assert how a user is allowed to access a 
resource. 
 
2.5.1 Community Authorization Service (CAS) 
The Community Authorization service (CAS) provides a scalable mechanism for 
specifying and enforcing complex and dynamic policies that govern resource usage 
within Grids. It allows resource providers to delegate some of the authority for 
maintaining fine-grain access control policies to communities, while still maintaining the 
ultimate authority over their resources [14]. 
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A community runs a CAS server to keep track of its membership and fine-grain 
access control policies. A user accessing community resources contacts the CAS server, 
which delegates rights to the user based on the request and the user's responsibilities 
within the community. These rights are in the form of capabilities, which users can 
present at a resource to gain access on behalf of the community. The user effectively 
obtains the intersection of the set of rights granted to the community by the resource 
provider and the set of rights defined by the capabilities granted to the user by the 
community. The CAS server uses a backend database to store the capabilities of the 
users. The CAS architecture builds on the public key authentication and delegation 
mechanisms provided by the Globus Toolkits Grid Security Infrastructure (GSI) [14].  
 
If a user of a community needs to gain access to a resource, the user generates a 
proxy credential which is signed by his/her own user credential. The proxy credential is 
presented to the CAS server, which returns a new credential, known as CAS proxy 
credential. This credential contains the CAS policy assertions to represent the users 
capabilities and restrictions as an extension. SAML authorization decision statements are 
used to express the CAS policy assertions. The CAS proxy credential is presented to the 
resource provider. The resource provider verifies the validity of the proxy credential and 
then parses the CAS policy assertions to obtain the restrictions imposed by the CAS 
server. Thus, the CAS credential facilitates the mapping of the user to a local account, 
and the restrictions determine the operations the user is allowed to perform. 
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CAS provides scalability in terms of the number of users and VOs. The CAS 
structure reduces the number of necessary trust relationships from C×P to C+P, when 
there are C consumers and P providers. Each consumer needs to be known and trusted by 
the CAS server, but not by each provider. Similarly, each provider needs to be known and 
trusted by the CAS server, but not by each consumer [14]. However, in terms of the 
actual number of access requests on resources, using a single CAS server may not be 
quite scalable. A single CAS server can be a bottleneck if a large number of users attempt 
to access it at the same time, and it can be a single point of failure. A possible solution for 
these problems depends on how frequently the community policies change. If the 
community policies do not change frequently, a single master server can be maintained to 
accept the changes and then routinely replicate the policies to one or more read-only 
slave servers. If the community policies change frequently, multiple peer servers can be 
used. All the servers update the policies, so that the failure of any one server will not lead 
to a loss of functionality [14].  
 
However, when policies are changing dynamically, it is believed that complete 
centralization of policies (which can be realized by using CAS) can achieve better 
consistency. Also, in the case that a user credential is compromised, revocation is easier 
when a single CAS server is used because the user needs to be removed only from that 
server [14]. Even though CAS was designed primarily for fine-grain policies, it has been 
also shown to be capable of asserting coarse-grain group memberships [41, 42]. CAS 
comes packaged within the Globus Toolkit and is easily deployable. 
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2.5.2 Shibboleth and GridShib 
In the GridShib project [33], they leverage the local security infrastructures of 
different organizations so that users can be authenticated to Grid resources by using the 
methods already supported at their home organizations. The goal of GridShib is to create 
a distributed authorization framework that supports anonymous interactions between 
users and, hence, protects their privacy. The rights of the users can be expressed using 
attributes such as institutional affiliation, group membership, or their role in collaboration 
[33]. Resource providers can make informed authorization decisions using these 
attributes unlike in identity-based authorization. For example, only graduate students 
studying computer science in a particular university and enrolled in a particular course 
can gain access to certain database records. 
 
GridShib incorporates the Shibboleth [15], which is an Attribute Authority service, 
developed by the Internet2 community for cross-organization identity federation [33]. 
Shibboleth creates a distributed authorization infrastructure for web resources, and 
simplifies access control policies and makes them more scalable [43]. It enables 
anonymous interaction between users, thus protecting individual privacy while still 
providing basic security for resource providers [33]. The Shibboleth service maps a user 
name and attributes onto a unique identifying handle. To protect the users privacy, the 
service can restrict the information about the holder of the handle depending on who is 
asking for the information. For example, it does not release the users name except to 
those requestors who have been authorized [29]. 
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A target Grid service authenticates a user by using GSI, determines the address of 
the appropriate Shibboleth attribute service in the process, and then obtains the selected 
user attributes, that the Grid Service is authorized to see, from the Shibboleth service. 
These attributes are presented using SAML attribute statements. To determine the address 
of the Shibboleth attribute service, the Grid service obtains a pointer that will be placed in 
the users proxy certificate [33]. The attributes obtained will then be used by the Grid 
service in making authorization decisions. These attributes will be passed securely 
through a trust relationship to the Grid service. To provide anonymity in the Grid context, 
users are issued a set of credentials with pseudonym identifiers, and they will have the 
option of releasing only a subset of their attributes to particular resources. For example, 
identifying information about the user doesnt need to be released. 
 
2.6 Concepts and Foundation for our Research Topics 
In order to provide scalable and fine-grain access control in Data Grids, we will 
enhance the access control mechanisms in OGSA-DAI to allow users to be assigned 
memberships on VO roles and to support role hierarchies and constraints. We will show 
that the SAML assertions of CAS and Shibboleth can provide the users privileges 
directly in addition to the VO roles. These assertions could be obtained by the resource 
using either a push model or a pull model. In the push model, the user can directly obtain 
the permissions from the authorization server and pass them to the target resources at the 
time of making a request. The resource will verify the authenticity of the user and then 
authorize the user based on the permissions obtained, provided the authority that issued 
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them is trustworthy. The advantage of the push model is that the user can explicitly select 
a role. Also, in the case that the user and the authorization service belong to the same 
organization and are protected by a firewall, the push model should be deployed because 
the resources may not be able to contact the authorization service directly. Some 
authorization services, like Akenti, support the pull model, where the user is 
authenticated by a target resource. The target resource contacts the authorization server to 
obtain the users permissions. An advantage of the pull model is that it can be deployed 
easily because users do not need to interact with the authorization service [33]. 
 
Specification of VO policies by CAS and Shibboleth will allow for authorization 
decisions to be made easily based on the users request and VO policies. In case the user 
does not possess the required privileges, the access can be denied by CAS and Shibboleth 
without involving the resource providers. For OGSA-DAI, this eliminates authentication, 
mapping and connection overheads on the resource providers in case the users request is 
not valid. The resource providers then need to maintain only the mapping information 
from the VO roles to local database roles and the local policies, thus the number of 
entries to be managed in the role-map files will be reduced dramatically. When users 
join/leave collaborations, the resource providers do not have to bother about updating 
their information in the role-map files, because the authorization service can just 
grant/revoke their memberships on the VO roles. Different VOs may have different role 
structures. Furthermore, the resource providers can grant or refuse the access requests of 
specific users by maintaining their authorization information separately in the role-map 
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Figure 2.1: Mapping VO Roles to Local Roles 
files. This will enable the resource providers to maintain ultimate authority over their 
resources.  
 
2.6.1 Enforcement of VO Policies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In our systems, the decision to map a VO role to a local role lies in the hands of the 
resource provider. The assignment of privileges to the local role and specifying 
constraints on it will also be the responsibility of the resource provider. For example, as 
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shown in Figure 2.1, a resource provider could decide to map the 
ER,RoleName=Physician role, where ER could be an Emergency Team that forms a VO 
across several hospitals, to a local role that allows the SELECT and UPDATE operations 
to be performed between 19:00 and 5:00 GMT, Monday through Friday during 
10.01.200607.30.2006 (say, only for those patients affected by a natural disaster). This 
timing constraint could be enforced by a database trigger, which executes an action 
automatically on the occurrence of a predefined event. The privileges and constraints 
associated with the local role can be negotiated between the VO and the resource 
provider. Alternatively, if local privileges and constraints have been fixed already, they 
can be made known to the VO. 
 
The VO can restrict the policies further by specifying a subset of the privileges 
associated with the local role and/or specifying tighter constraints. For example, 
applications invoked by users in a Junior Physician VO role may be allowed to perform 
SELECT and UPDATE operations only between 21:00 and 5:00 GMT, instead of 
between 19:00 and 5:00 GMT. This scheme allows the VO to change privileges and 
constraints without involving the resource provider. However, these changes have to be 
enforced at the VO level. For example, the users query and the current time can be 
examined in order to check the conformance with those changes. In this way, the resource 
provider does not have to create new local roles in addition to existing ones because both 
the original and restricted VO roles can be mapped to the same local role. Furthermore, 
the resource provider can enforce more restrictions in addition to those imposed by the 
VO policy; for example, restricting the access privilege of particular users based on their 
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institutional affiliation. For this purpose, the resource provider can maintain a separate 
list of users and deny their access by checking the Grid identity in the SAML assertion. 
This enables the resource provider to have the ultimate authority over its resources.  
 
2.6.2 Distributing VO Policies among Resource Providers 
If roles and privileges do not change often and VOs have a long lifespan, then it is 
feasible to distribute the VO policies among the various resource providers. The fine-
grain privileges and constraints associated with the local role can be negotiated between 
the VO and the resource provider. But, the resource provider will have control over the 
actual assignment of fine-grain privileges to the local role and the specification of 
constraints on it. For example, a resource provider could grant permission to perform 
basic database operations (e.g., SELECT) on a particular database table. The resource 
provider could also grant permissions for more complex operations such as executing 
stored database procedures.   
 
With our systems, a user can delegate a subset of his/her authorized VO roles to 
certain applications and services. In this case, the privileges associated with the delegated 
VO roles are the privileges associated with the corresponding local roles. As shown in 
Figure 2.2, after a negotiation with a VO, a resource provider could decide to map the 
Alpha,RN=Supervisor role (where Alpha is the name of the VO) to a local Supervisor 
role that allows the function updateInventory( ) to be performed between 9:00 and 5:00 
GMT from Monday to Friday during 01.20.200607.30.2006. Another resource provider 
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Figure 2.2: Distributing VO Policy among the Resource Providers 
could decide to map the same VO role to a local Employee role that allows the function 
viewInventory() to be performed between 19:00 and 5:00 GMT from Monday to Friday 
during 05.20.200607.30.2006. 
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Chapter 3  
 
RBAC with CAS in the OGSA-DAI 
System 
 
The goal of this research topic was to design and implement a Role-based Access 
Control (RBAC) system with CAS, which can be quickly and easily deployed at various 
sites using the Open Grid Services Architecture  Data Access and Integration (OGSA-
DAI). We demonstrate that our system can support RBAC for multiple virtual 
organizations (VOs) to access Grid databases within the OGSA-DAI framework. Our 
system extends the access control mechanism supported by OGSA-DAI to allow users to 
be assigned memberships on VO roles, to assign privileges and specify constraints on 
those roles, and to allow role hierarchies.  
 
In our system, CAS maintains the security policies of VOs, grants users 
memberships on VO roles, and then authorizes them in those roles. The resource 
providers need to maintain only the mapping information from VO roles to local database 
roles and the local policies, thus the number of entries in the role-map file is reduced 
dramatically. Our system also allows the specification of policies at the VO level, thus if 
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the users do not possess the required privileges, their access can be denied at the VO level 
itself. This eliminates unnecessary authentication, mapping and connection overheads on 
the resource providers. When users join/leave a VO, the resource providers do not have to 
bother about individually adding/removing their information in the role-map files because 
the CAS server can just grant/revoke their memberships on the VO roles. Furthermore, 
the resource providers can grant or refuse the access requests of specific users by 
maintaining their authorization information separately in the role-map files. This enables 
the resource providers to have the ultimate authority over their resources. 
 
We have implemented the proposed system and analyzed its performance. In our 
implementation, users obtain CAS credentials based on user credentials. The user 
credential is formed by an X.509 certificate and the associated public/private keys and is 
issued by a Certificate Authority (CA) trusted by all entities in a Grid [44]. The CAS 
credentials contain the authorization information for the user in terms of his/her VO roles. 
We have extended the client-side implementation of OGSA-DAI to pass the CAS 
credential. The server-side has been extended to parse the CAS credential to obtain the 
VO roles. The server also verifies the capabilities associated with that VO role against the 
local policies of the resource provider and maps it to a local database role. We have 
evaluated our solution in terms of the overheads incurred when security contexts are set 
up between a client and a server. This has been done with respect to the original security 
mechanism in OGSA-DAI. 
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The organization of the chapter is as follows: Section 3.1 describes how users can 
access a data resource using OGSA-DAI Services. In Section 3.2, we describe the 
drawbacks for the existing approach for RBAC with CAS. In Section 3.3, we present our 
RBAC system using CAS in OGSA-DAI. Section 3.4 describes the implementation 
details, and Section 3.5 describes the results of performance analysis. 
 
3.1 OGSA-DAI Services 
In order to expose physical data resources to the Grid, by extending the interfaces 
defined by Open Grid Services Infrastructure (OGSI) [45], OGSA-DAI introduced the 
following services [46]: (1) Grid Data Service Factory (GDSF): Represents a data 
resource, and exposes its capabilities and metadata. (2) Grid Data Service (GDS): Created 
by a GDSF and holds the client session with the data resource. (3) DAI Service Group 
Registry (DAISGR): Clients can discover service/data by locating GDSFs registered with 
a DAISGR. 
 
Figure 3.1 shows how clients can access data resources using OGSA-DAI. The 
client first contacts the DAISGR and gets information about the registered GDSFs. The 
client then contacts the desired GDSF and makes a request for the creation of a GDS. 
Once the GDS is created, it authorizes the client and establishes a JDBC connection to 
the underlying database. The client can then submit queries on the database and retrieve 
results. The client authorization process is discussed in detail in Section 2.1. 
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CAS was initially designed to record user groups and their permissions, but in our 
system, CAS has been incorporated to support RBAC within the OGSA-DAI framework. 
With our system, the resource providers can delegate the fine-grain authorization to CAS 
which will grant users memberships on VO roles and then authorize them in those roles.  
 
3.2 Drawbacks of the Existing Approach for RBAC 
with CAS 
A proposed approach for supporting RBAC with CAS is the use of rights 
associated with a role to access role-specific resources [41]. The role of a user is 
presented in a hierarchical form. For example, Alpha/admin indicates the administrator 
role of a virtual organization Alpha. Alpha could be the name of a project undertaken by 
collaborating organizations. In VOs, users may be assigned specific tasks, and there may 
be constraints related to the execution of those tasks. For example, a user may have 
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Figure 3.1: Accessing a Data Resource through OGSA-DAI 
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access to data only during certain days of the week. One of the key aspects of RBAC is 
that it allows the specification of constraints on roles [10]. However, the approach 
proposed in [41] does not address this aspect of RBAC. Another drawback is that for a 
user to act in multiple roles, multiple CAS proxy certificates have to be created.  
 
Most systems do not enforce the Principle of Least Privilege [47]. An application 
must be delegated only those privileges required for completing a certain set of tasks, 
otherwise the application should be totally trusted to do no more than required. In Grids, 
this is even more critical since software can be regularly downloaded from remote sites. 
In addition to the possibility of downloading malicious software such as Viruses, Trojans, 
Worms, and so on, we cannot expect software to work exactly as specified because of 
bugs or malicious intent. Any software with certain extra privileges has the potential to 
cause severe damage to computer systems and data. When the method proposed in [41] is 
used in CAS, the Principle of Least Privilege is not always enforced. Users authorized to 
act in a role may be granted some privileges in addition to those assigned to that role. 
This is because both roles and privileges are set up in the same way. In particular, a role 
is considered as a resource, and a user group is given the member right on a role, in the 
same way that a user group is given the read right on a resource such as a file. With the 
current implementation of CAS, a user belonging to multiple groups can request and be 
authorized any combination of roles and privileges from one or more of those groups at 
the same time.  
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The following example illustrates this problem. The VO Alpha may have a policy 
in which programmers are allowed only read access to a particular file while supervisors 
are allowed read/write access. To implement this policy based on the method proposed in 
[41], two roles, Alpha/programmer and Alpha/supervisor, can be created as shown in 
Figures 3.2 and 3.3. The Alpha/programmer role can be assigned the read right on 
ftp://localhost/tmp/fileA.txt, and the Alpha/supervisor role can be assigned the read 
and write rights on ftp://localhost/tmp/fileA.txt. As users of userGroup1 are given the 
member right on the role Alpha/programmer, they can acquire the read right on 
ftp://localhost/tmp/fileA.txt. Similarly, as users of userGroup2 are given the member 
right on the role Alpha/supervisor, they can acquire the read and write rights on 
ftp://localhost/tmp/fileA.txt. If a user user1 is in both userGroup1 and userGroup2, 
and makes a request to act in the Alpha/programmer role with the read and write 
rights on ftp://localhost/tmp/fileA.txt, CAS will authorize the request because user1 
is a member of both user groups. This authorization decision clearly violates the VO 
policy in terms of the Principle of Least Privilege, since a programmer is granted write 
access to a file while he/she is allowed only read access to it. If there is an application 
that analyzes data for programmers, it must be delegated only the read access to the file. 
Delegating the write access to the application can potentially result in an alteration of the 
file. 
 
A possible refinement to this method is distributing the VO policies to the resource 
providers while keeping only the assignment of users to the VO roles within CAS. This 
method is applicable if roles and privileges do not change often and VOs have a long 
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lifespan. CAS is not used to associate the privileges with roles to access role-specific 
resources. Instead, the VO role is mapped to a local role, and the assignment of fine-grain 
privileges to the local role is the responsibility of the resource provider. The fine-grain 
privileges associated with the local role can be negotiated between the VO and the 
resource provider. 
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Figure 3.4: Distributing VO Policies to the Resource Providers 
A user can delegate a subset of his/her authorized VO roles to certain applications 
and services. In this case, the privileges associated with the delegated VO roles are the 
privileges associated with the corresponding local roles. As shown in Figure 3.4, after a 
negotiation with a VO, a resource provider could decide to map the Alpha/supervisor 
role to a local Supervisor role that allows the function updateInventory( ) to be 
performed on a database (DB1). Another resource provider could decide to map the same 
VO role to a local Employee role that allows the function viewInventory( ) to be 
performed on another database (DB2). This method enforces the Principle of Least 
Privilege since a user can receive no more privileges for a VO role other than those tied 
with the corresponding local roles. However, a VO does not have the flexibility to update 
VO policy without contacting the resource providers because they control the assignment 
of privileges to the local roles. 
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3.3 Our Proposed System for RBAC Using CAS 
Specification of policies at the VO level allows authorization decisions to be made 
based on the users request and VO policies. In case the user does not possess the 
required privileges, the access can be denied at the VO level itself without involving the 
resource providers. This eliminates authentication, mapping and connection overheads on 
the resource providers in case the request is not valid. Our proposed system is 
implemented using a newer version of CAS which supports SAML. Participating 
organizations within VOs may have different security models. So, it is important for these 
models to interoperate at different levels of trust, and SAML can be used to uniformly 
express the authorization assertions between different security domains.  
 
The CAS server contains policy statements that specify who (which user or group) 
has the permission, which resource or resource group the permission is granted on, and 
what permission is granted [14]. The permission is denoted by a service type and an 
action. The action describes the operation (e.g., read, write or execute program), and the 
service type defines the namespace in which the action is defined (e.g., file). Different 
resource providers may recognize different service types, but all resource providers that 
recognize the same service type should have the same interpretation of that service type's 
actions [14]. 
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To support RBAC using CAS, we define the role as a new service type, and each 
role name in the form of [VOName{,SubgroupName}][,RN=rolename]1 as an action. 
Roles can be specified for any subgroup within a VO. For example, 
Alpha,RN=Manager indicates the Manager role for the Alpha VO, whereas 
Alpha,Data,RN=Manager indicates the Manager role for the Data subgroup of the 
Alpha VO.  
For each role name, we can specify the actions (privileges and constraints) and some 
junior roles. Resources represented in the form, URI{.Subcomponent} are associated 
with usergroups in the CAS database. Thus, fine-grain authorization for resources can be 
allowed, where access control can be specified not only for the entire resource (e.g. 
database) but also for the subcomponents of a resource (e.g. table). For example, 
http://130.108.17.176:8080/ogsa/services/ogsadai/SecureGridDataServiceFactory.Emplo
yee indicates the Employee table in the database represented by the specified URI. This 
permits the members of a usergroup to access a resource in a specific role. We propose 
new service types and actions to assign privileges on roles, and to specify timing 
constraints as described in the following subsections. With these proposed ideas, 
privileges can be specified at fine-grain levels. 
 
                                                        
1 The curly brackets {} indicate zero or more occurrences of their content and the square brackets [] 
indicate only one occurrence of their content. 
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3.3.1 Specifying Privileges and Timing Constraints on VO 
Roles 
To assign privileges on a role, we define the role name as a service type and each 
privilege in the form of privilege:operation as an action. This allows the specification 
of a privilege in terms of the operation permitted for a specific role. For example, the role 
name Alpha,RN=Manager could have privilege:select as a privilege to execute the 
SELECT operation. Obviously, not only the basic database operations, but also complex 
operations, such as transactions and stored procedures, can be assigned as privileges. 
 
To specify a timing constraint on a role, we define the role name as a service type 
and the timing constraint in the following form as an action:   
timing_constraint:[local/GMT] [Date#Day#Time]{;Date#Day#Time} where  
• Date can be [FromDate-ToDate]{,FromDate-ToDate}  
• Day can be [FromDay-ToDay]{,FromDay-ToDay} or [Day]{,Day} 
• Time can be [FromTime-ToTime]{,FromTime-ToTime} 
For example, the role name Alpha,RN=Manager could have 
timing_constraint:GMT#10.01.2005-07.30.2006#Mon-Fri#1:00-5:00,17:00-21:00, 
indicating that the user can act in that role only within the time intervals 1:005:00 and 
17:0021:00 GMT from Monday to Friday during 10.01.200507.30.2006. 
 
 
 
40
3.3.2 Specifying Role Hierarchies 
A role hierarchy defines a seniority relation between roles, whereby senior roles 
automatically acquire the permissions of the junior roles. In the role hierarchy diagrams 
[48], senior roles are placed at the top of the junior roles. According to the NIST standard 
for RBAC [48], there are two types of role hierarchies: limited hierarchy and general 
hierarchy.  In the limited hierarchy, each senior role cannot have more than one junior 
role. On the other hand, in the general hierarchy, each senior role can have multiple 
junior roles. However, in both types, a junior role can have multiple senior roles. 
Examples of a limited hierarchy and a general hierarchy are illustrated in Figures 3.5 and 
3.6, respectively. 
 
 
 
              Figure 3.5: An Example of Limited Role Hierarchy. 
 
The selection of the type of role hierarchy is made by the VO. To specify a role 
hierarchy, we define each senior role name as a service type and each junior role name in 
the form of junior_role:[VOName{,SubgroupName}][,RN=rolename] as an action. For 
example, in Figure 3.6, the senior role name Alpha,RN=Manager has 
junior_role:Alpha,RN=Supervisor and junior_role:Alpha,RN=Programmer as junior 
role names, and thereby inherits their privileges.  
 
Supervisor 
Employee 
Programmer
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                    Figure 3.6: An Example of General Role Hierarchy. 
 
The constraints on a junior role are also inherited by a senior role [28]. In our 
method, the timing constraint specified on a senior role would override those on the 
junior roles. If a timing constraint is not specified on a senior role, then it inherits the 
timing constraints of its junior roles. However, there should be no conflicts between the 
timing constraints on the junior roles. If such conflicts exist, then the concept of limited 
inheritance [10] can be used. With limited inheritance, a senior role can inherit only a 
subset of privileges of a junior role. The following example illustrates the concept of 
limited inheritance. As shown in the hierarchy of Figure 3.6, the Manager role is senior to 
both the Supervisor and Programmer roles. Managers can be prevented from inheriting 
specific privileges of the Supervisor role by defining a new role Supervisor′ as shown in 
Figure 3.7. Only those specific privileges not to be inherited by the Manager role can be 
assigned to the Supervisor′ role and the rest of the original set of privileges can be 
retained by the Supervisor role. The Supervisor′ role can inherit the privileges from the 
Supervisor role, thus acquires the entire set of privileges originally held by the Supervisor 
role. The Manager role can then inherit the privileges of the Supervisor role but not the 
privileges of the Supervisor′ role. Similarly, by creating the Programmer′ role, the 
Manager 
Supervisor 
Employee 
Programmer Secretary
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Manager role can be prevented from inheriting specific privileges originally held by the 
Programmer role.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To deal with conflicting constraints on junior roles, some modifications to the 
approach illustrated above are required. If conflicting timing constraints exist on the 
Supervisor and Programmer roles shown in Figure 3.6, then new timing constraints with 
no conflicts can be specified on those roles while each retains the entire set of its 
privileges. The Manager role can then inherit the privileges and new constraints on the 
Supervisor and Programmer roles. The original timing constraints of the Supervisor and 
Programmer roles can be specified on the Supervisor′ and Programmer′ roles, 
respectively. These timing constraints will then override the new constraints specified on 
the Supervisor and Programmer roles. The Supervisor′ and Programmer′ roles are not 
assigned any privileges and can inherit all the privileges from the Supervisor and 
Programmer roles, respectively. Thus the Supervisor′ and Programmer′ roles possess the 
set of timing constraints and privileges originally associated with the Supervisor and 
Programmer roles, respectively. While the original information of the Supervisor and 
Manager 
Supervisor 
Employee 
Programmer Secretary
Supervisor′ Programmer′ 
Figure 3.7: Limited Inheritance 
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Programmer roles is retained, the Manager role can still inherit their privileges without 
any conflicts due to the newly specified timing constraints. 
 
3.3.3 Authorization Decision Statement in the CAS credential 
Once the roles and their privileges and constraints are specified in the CAS 
database as described above, a SAML authorization decision statement is included in the 
CAS credential. An example of the SAML authorization decision statement is shown in 
Figure 3.8, and its components, denoted by (1), (2), (3) and (4), are explained as follows: 
(1) specifies the time period during which the authorization decision is valid. 
(2) specifies the URI of the resource on which the permissions are granted. 
(3) specifies the identity of the user to whom the permissions are granted. 
(4) specifies what permissions are granted. 
 
The user identified by the Subject in (3) is authorized in the role 
Alpha,RN=Manager with the privilege to execute the UPDATE operation on the 
resource specified in (2). Also, Alpha,RN=Manager inherits, from its junior role 
Alpha,RN=Supervisor, the privilege to execute the SELECT operation on the same 
resource with the specified timing constraint gmt#10.01.2005-07.30.2006#MON-
FRI#19:00-5:00. The timing constraint specifies the duration for which the user can 
access the resource in the authorized role. This authorization decision is valid for the time 
period specified in (1). 
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3.4 Implementation Details 
CAS has a backend database for storing information about users, resources and 
associated privileges. The VO members are granted user credentials signed by a 
Certificate Authority (CA). CAS issues a certificate to authorize users based on their 
requested role, their user credentials and the role membership information in the CAS 
database. The CAS database administrator can delegate the right to grant/revoke 
Figure 3.8: SAML Authorization Decision Statement Issued by CAS 
<Assertion xmlns="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.0:assertion" 
AssertionID="8b53a37e-3116-44e2-a499-67e2d0fe49f1" 
IssueInstant="2005-12-02T19:58:23Z" 
Issuer="O=Grid,OU=GlobusTest,OU=simpleCA-
motive.cs.wright.edu,CN=Globus Simple CA" MajorVersion="1" 
MinorVersion="0"> 
 
<Conditions NotBefore="2005-12-02T19:58:23Z" NotOnOrAfter= 
"2005-12-02T21:20:53Z"></Conditions> 
 
<AuthorizationDecisionStatement Decision="permit" 
Resource="http://130.108.17.176:8080/ogsa/services/ogsadai/SecureGrid
DataServiceFactory.Employee"> 
 
<Subject> /O=Grid/OU=GlobusTest/OU=simpleCA-
motive.cs.wright.edu/OU=cs.wright.edu/CN=John  Doe 
</Subject> 
.. 
<Action Namespace="role">Alpha,RN=Manager</Action> 
<Action Namespace="Alpha,RN=Manager">privilege: 
update</Action> 
<Action Namespace ="Alpha,RN=Manager">junior_role: 
Alpha,RN=Supervisor</Action> 
 
<Action Namespace="Alpha,RN=Supervisor">privilege: 
select</Action> 
<Action Namespace="Alpha,RN=Supervisor">timing_constraint: 
gmt#10.01.2005-07.30.2006#MON-FRI#19:00-5:00</Action> 
 
</AuthorizationDecisionStatement> 
.. 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(1)
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memberships on roles to other users, and those users can exercise that right only within 
the user groups to which they belong. 
 
CAS provides a set of APIs for managing fine-grain access policies for resources in 
a VO [17]. The Service API of CAS provides an administrative interface for managing 
the user groups and associated privileges. This API supports the users role assignments 
in our method. CAS also provides a Client API through which users can obtain a signed 
SAML assertion and present it to the resource provider for authorization. The OGSA-
DAI client program uses the Java Generic Security Services API (GSSAPI) to delegate 
the CAS credential to a Grid Data Service (GDS).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
We configured CAS to incorporate the proposed RBAC method as described before 
and modified the OGSA-DAI implementation to make use of the CAS credentials. The 
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" ?> 
<!--  (c) International Business Machines Corporation, 2002 - 2004.  -->  
<!--  (c) University of Edinburgh, 2002 - 2004.  -->  
<!-- See OGSA-DAI-Licence.txt for licencing information.  -->  
<DatabaseRoles> 
     <Database name="jdbc:mysql://130.108.17.176/ogsadai"> 
<User dn="No Certificate Provided" userid="ogsadai" password="ogsadai" />  
<User dn="/O=Grid/OU=GlobusTest/OU=simpleCA-
motive.cs.wright.edu/OU=cs.wright.edu/CN=John Doe"  
userid="ogsadai" password="ogsadai" />  
 
<User dn="ER,RN=Physician" userid="username" password="password"/> 
       
<Role Name="ER,RN=Physician"> 
       <Action Namespace="role">privilege:select</Action>  
       <Action Namespace="role">privilege:update</Action> 
       <Action Namespace="role">timing_constraint:GMT#10.01.2005-
07.30.2006#MON-FRI#19:00-5:00</Action>  
 </Role> 
   </Database> 
</DatabaseRoles> 
Figure 3.9: Modified Role-map File 
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modifications are made at both client-side and server-side. The client is modified to 
delegate the CAS credential instead of the user proxy credential. The server is modified 
to recognize the CAS credential delegated by the client and to obtain the VO role from it 
using the GSSAPI libraries. The modified server also verifies the privileges and 
constraints associated with the VO role against the local policy, and performs the 
mapping based on that role via the role-map file. The role-map file has been extended to 
include the mapping from a VO role to a database username and a password. Also 
included in it are the local policy details as shown in Figure 3.9. The role-map file can 
also include a list of users for whom access would be denied based on their Grid identity. 
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  The following is the sequential process of a Grid user obtaining a CAS credential 
for accessing a resource. As shown in Figure 3.10, a user generates a certificate (Cu) by 
making a request to a Certificate Authority (CA) which is trusted by all the entities within 
the Grid, i.e., all users and resources. If a user needs to gain access to a resource, the user 
generates a proxy credential (Cup) which is signed by his/her user certificate (Cu). This 
generated proxy credential's lifetime will be less than the lifetime of the user certificate. 
The lifetime of a proxy credential generated using the Globus Toolkit is 12 hours. In 
order to use a CAS credential, the user makes a request to the CAS server to initiate a 
CAS proxy based on the users proxy credential. The CAS server authenticates the user 
and obtains the users capability details present in the CAS database. The CAS server 
then creates a CAS proxy credential (Cucasp) which contains the CAS policy assertions 
to represent the users capabilities and restrictions as an extension to the existing user 
proxy credential (Cup).  
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DAI Using a CAS Credential 
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As shown in Figure 3.11, once the user has obtained the CAS credential with the 
requested assertions, the user can contact the desired GDSF to create a GDS. The GDS 
gets the CAS credential delegated by the user, and verifies the capabilities against its 
local policy present in the role-map file. The GDS also checks if any specified timing 
constraint is violated.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.12 depicts a typical user session using the command-line tools provided by 
the Globus Toolkit, CAS and OGSA-DAI, which shows the initiations of the user proxy 
and the CAS proxy. We have modified the OGSA-DAI client to accept the CAS 
credential and the desired VO role specified as shown in Figure 3.12. Based on the VO 
role of the user, a JDBC connection is established between the GDS and the database 
exposed by the GDSF. If no role is provided in the CAS credential, then the users 
identity is used for mapping. The client can submit queries to the GDS and obtain the 
results in XML documents.  
 
#Initiate a User Proxy 
% grid-proxy-init 
Your identity: /O=Grid/OU=GlobusTest/OU=simpleCA-
motive.cs.wright.edu/OU=cs.wright.edu/CN=John Doe 
Enter GRID pass phrase for this identity: 
Creating proxy... Done  
Your proxy is valid until: Fri Dec 2 21:20:53 2005 
 
#Initiate a CAS Proxy 
%cas-proxy-init -c  
http://localhost:8080/ogsa/services/base/cas/CASService -t tag 
 
#Contacting a specific GDSF using CAS capabilities 
%java uk.org.ogsadai.client.Client -mls -role ER,RN=Physician -t tag -factory 
http://130.108.17.176:8080/ogsa/services/ogsadai/SecureGridDataService 
Factory examples/GDSPerform/JDBC/query/select1Row.xml 
Figure 3.12: User Session Accessing a GDS Using CAS 
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In our implementation, the GDS checks the local policy in the role-map file against 
the policy assertion in the CAS credential only before connecting the client to the 
database. After a CAS credential is issued, if a set of privileges is deleted from a VO role 
on the CAS server and/or the timing constraints on the role are changed then the 
credentials have to be expired before the new policy takes effect on the resources. We 
have not implemented mechanisms to revoke current credentials containing old policy 
assertions. However, if the same set of privileges deleted from the VO role is also deleted 
from each of the corresponding local roles, or the same changes to the timing constraints 
are made, then the access to the resources can be restricted immediately based on the new 
policy. The resource providers can use the local database management systems (DBMSs) 
to update the privileges on the local database roles and modify the triggers to 
accommodate the new timing constraints. The changes in the local policy information 
also have to be made in the role-map files. Since the privileges and timing constraints on 
the local database roles are enforced by the local DBMS itself, they will come into effect 
immediately. If the client submits a query, but the query fails due to the new policy, then 
the client can be notified via an error message. The client can request new credentials and 
then restart the application. 
 
If a VO role is updated independently of the corresponding local roles after the 
credentials are issued, one way to restrict the access immediately is to have the CAS 
server notify the GDSFs of the updates.  This information can be passed on to the GDSs 
and cached by the GDSFs for up to the maximum lifetime of the credential. Any 
credential issued before the notification and containing an authorized VO role, which has 
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been updated on the CAS server, can then be rejected. If a connection to the resource has 
been already established based on that role, then it should be discontinued. 
 
If the local policy is changed to deny the access of a particular Grid user after that 
user has already been connected to the resource, then this new policy is not enforced 
because the role-map file is not rechecked. One possible solution to enforce the new local 
policy immediately is to notify the GDS every time the local policy information in the 
role-map file is updated, so that the user identity and policy assertion in the CAS 
credential can be checked against the local policy information. 
 
With our method, a user who wants to perform the tasks associated with multiple 
roles does not need to generate multiple CAS proxies. The user can just delegate a single 
CAS credential containing all those roles. For example, a user may want to read from one 
database in one role and write to another database in another role. In this case, a single 
CAS credential containing both roles can be delegated, and then the user can be 
authorized by each resource provider with respect to the corresponding role.  
 
3.5 Performance Analysis  
The existing implementation of the OGSA-DAI client has been modified to 
delegate a CAS credential, and the server has been modified to obtain the users 
capabilities present in the CAS credential. The overheads incurred with our 
implementation are compared with those of the existing implementation of OGSA-DAI, 
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which does not use the CAS credential. OGSA-DAI Release 4.0 was deployed on a 
Jakarta Tomcat 5.0.27/Globus Toolkit 3.2.1 (GT3) stack running on a Linux machine 
with a 2.6 GHz Intel Pentium IV processor and 1 GB of RAM. The littleblackbook 
MySQL database table distributed with OGSA-DAI was used as a test database, and it 
contains 10,000 tuples. The perform document consisting of a request for a single tuple 
was used for the purpose of analysis. 
 
3.5.1 Profiling Details 
A Java method System.currentTimeMillis() is used to get the current system time in 
milliseconds. Also, for the server-side analysis, the Apache Log4j logger, which logs 
time to a log file in milliseconds, is used. For more accuracy, the tomcat container was 
shutdown and restarted before each client request in order to minimize the caching effects 
within GT3 and OGSA-DAI [49]. The main changes from the original configuration are 
the way the mapping is done at the server-side and how the credential is delegated at the 
client-side. So, only the security aspects of the client and the server are profiled and 
analyzed. The following types of Grid Data Services are used in the analysis as in [49]: 
1) Signature: GDS enforcing GSI Secure Conversation with Signature. This enforces 
message integrity being established between the client and the server.  
2) Encryption: GDS enforcing GSI Secure Conversation with Encryption. This enforces 
message privacy being established.  
3) None: GDS which does not enforce any security. The GDS does not provide a secure 
conversation. 
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3.5.2 Client-Side Security 
A call is made to each of the above GDSs with and without using a CAS proxy 
credential. In case of using a CAS proxy credential, an additional overhead for its 
creation is incurred. In the performance analysis, we do not show this overhead because it 
is incurred only once before the client contacts the GDSs. Thereafter, the client can 
submit any number of queries before the CAS proxy credential expires. The lifetime of 
the CAS proxy credential is equal to the time remaining for the expiration of the user 
proxy credential, which can last up to 12 hours. The time taken for the creation of the 
CAS proxy credential depends on several factors such as network bandwidth and 
workload of the CAS server. In our system, the average time taken for the creation of a 
CAS proxy credential is around 600 milliseconds.  
 
The findServiceData method of a GDSF returns the information about its 
corresponding data resource. Three consecutive calls to findServiceData are required: 
The first call returns the database schema, the second returns the activities permitted, and 
the third returns the product type (for example, the type of DBMS). The perform method 
of a GDS takes the perform document, which contains the query, and returns the results 
to the client. GSI Secure Conversation requires a security context to be established 
between the client and the server. The overheads incurred in setting up this security 
context are analyzed based on the following: 
1.  Calls made for creating a credential object from the proxy credential.  
2.  Calls to the findServiceData and perform methods. 
 
 
53
0
2000
4000
6000
8000
10000
12000
14000
Signature
w ith CAS
Signature
w ithout
CAS
Encryption
w ith CAS
Encryption
w ithout
CAS
None w ith
CAS
None
w ithout
CAS
Ti
m
e 
(m
s)
Perform
FindServiceData3
FindServiceData2
FindServiceData1
Credential Creation
 
 
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
Signature
w ith CAS
Signature
w ithout
CAS
Encryption
w ith CAS
Encryption
w ithout
CAS
None w ith
CAS
None
w ithout
CAS
Ti
m
e 
(m
s)
Perform
FindServiceData3
FindServiceData2
  
 
 
The corresponding times are shown in Figure 3.13, and as observed, the time for 
creating the credential object is almost the same regardless of the security enforced by the 
GDS. In case of None, there is no such overhead as the credentials are not used. The first 
call to the findServiceData takes longer than the subsequent calls because it includes the 
initialization of the GDS regardless of the security type used. Figure 3.14 clearly shows 
Figure 3.14: Obtaining Service Data and Query Execution 
Figure 3.13: Client-Side Security 
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the times taken for the subsequent calls to the findServiceData and the perform methods. 
The times recorded in the case of using a CAS proxy credential and those without using a 
CAS proxy credential are almost the same. The reason is because all the security 
functions on the client-side remain unchanged except for the use of a CAS proxy 
credential instead of a user proxy credential. 
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Figure 3.15: Server-Side Security
Figure 3.16: Security Overheads on the Server-Side 
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3.5.3 Server-Side Security 
The analysis made on the server-side is based on the following: 
1. The client credentials accessed using the GT3 infrastructure.  
2. Extracting the VO role or Grid identity from the credential. If the VO role is extracted, 
its capabilities are compared against the local policy.  
3. Mapping a user to a database username and a password, and creating a JDBC 
connection.  
4. The perform operation. 
As shown in Figure 3.15, the time for the credential extraction, which includes 
policy comparison, is very small compared to the time for executing the perform 
operation. The time for executing the perform operation remains constant for all the 
GDSs. The perform operation is done only after the credential extraction process is 
completed; and as a result, its execution time is not affected by the type of credential 
Figure 3.17:  Mapping and Database Connection 
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used. The credential extraction times are shown more clearly in Figure 3.16, and we can 
see that the credential extraction takes more time when a CAS proxy credential is used 
for contacting a GDS that enforces the secure conversation. An overhead is incurred 
because of the time taken for obtaining the user identity and the policy assertion from the 
CAS credential and then comparing it against the local policy in the role-map file. 
However, this overhead is in the order of a few milliseconds and is insignificant 
compared to the overall time taken for performing the clients query. When a CAS proxy 
credential is not used, the user proxy credential is used instead, and then the credential 
extraction involves obtaining only the user identity. In case of contacting a nonsecure 
GDS, since credentials are not used, there are no overheads incurred for credential 
extraction. 
 
Figure 3.17 shows that there is a constant overhead for mapping a user to a 
database username and a password and then subsequently setting up the database 
connection. The processes of mapping and connection are done after the credential 
extraction process is completed; and as a result, their execution times are not affected by 
the type of credential used. If there are a large number of entries in the role-map file, the 
mapping would still not take much time because a hash table is used to store those 
entries.  
 
In summary, on the client-side, our method incurs small overheads in the security 
setup as additional steps are involved for requesting and using the CAS credential. 
However, as seen from the performance results, the time taken for the individual OGSA-
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DAI method calls are the same whether a CAS credential is used for authorization or not. 
This is because all the security functions remain unchanged, except for the use of a CAS 
proxy credential instead of a user proxy credential. On the server-side, the additional 
overheads incurred in our credential extraction process are very small compared to the 
time taken for executing the clients queries. These overheads in setting up the security 
context are insignificant when we consider the benefits of our method, such as scalability 
in managing VO policies and reduced administration overheads for resource providers.  
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Chapter 4 
 
RBAC with Shibboleth in the OGSA-
DAI System  
 
In the last chapter, we described how the Community Authorization Service (CAS) 
[14] can be used to enhance the security mechanism in OGSA-DAI. However, a single 
CAS server can be a bottleneck if a large number of users attempt to access it at the same 
time, and it can be a single point of failure. Also, while our system provides security in 
terms of access control, it does not provide privacy protection for the users because every 
CAS credential contains information that identifies the user. In this chapter, we propose 
for OGSA-DAI an RBAC system using Shibboleth, GridShib and the Object, Metadata 
and Artifacts Registry (OMAR) [50]. OGSA-DAI has recently been linked with the Web 
Services Resource Framework (WSRF). The newly defined OGSA-DAI Data Service can 
be dynamically configured and can expose multiple data resources, which can be any 
entity that acts as a source and/or a sink of data [13]. Shibboleth is designed to provide 
user attributes to the resources for access control, and it mainly targets the internet-based 
resources. In our system, it is also used as a Role Enablement Authority (REA), which is 
responsible for assigning roles to users and for enabling roles within a users session [17]. 
OMAR provides an implementation of the OASIS e-business eXtensible Markup 
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Language (ebXML) registry specifications. The ebXML registry specifications are 
developed to achieve interoperable registries and repositories with an interface that 
enables submission, query and retrieval [51]. 
 
Our system is scalable in terms of the number of access requests as well as the 
number of users and VOs; and it is robust as there is no single point of failure. It supports 
the management of roles and privileges; and also supports dynamic delegation of rights 
via roles. It also supports fine-grain attribute release policy and provides privacy 
protection for users within VOs that employ OGSA-DAI. Furthermore, similar to the 
previous system it can support a wide range of security policies using role-privileges, role 
hierarchies, delegations, and constraints. Resource providers need to maintain only the 
mapping information from VO roles to local roles and local policies, thus their 
administration overhead is reduced. When users join/leave a VO, the resource providers 
do not have to bother about individually adding/removing their information in the role-
map files, because OMAR can be used to directly grant/revoke their memberships on the 
VO roles. Moreover, the resource providers can permit or deny the access requests of 
specific users by maintaining their authorization information separately. This enables the 
resource providers to have the ultimate authority over their resources. Also, unnecessary 
mapping and connections can be avoided by denying invalid requests at the VO level. 
 
We have implemented our proposed system and analyzed its performance. The 
server-side of OGSA-DAI has been configured to use Shibboleth through GridShib. The 
GridShib software provides two interfaces, one for the Grid services and the other for 
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Figure 4.1: Accessing a data resource using GridShib and Shibboleth 
Shibboleth [33]. The OGSA-DAI server has been modified to obtain the users attributes 
from the Shibboleth service, verify them against the local policies, and map the user to a 
local role based on the role-map file. The role-map file has been extended to include the 
mapping from a VO role to a local role. Our performance analysis shows that the 
proposed system incurs a small overhead in setting up the security context between the 
client and server. This overhead is quite acceptable when we consider the benefits of our 
system, such as scalability in managing VO policies and reduced administration overhead 
for resource providers. 
 
The organization of the chapter is as follows: In Section 4.1, we propose a RBAC 
system with Shibboleth and GridShib in OGSA-DAI. In Section 4.2, we show how to 
manage VO policies using XACML and OMAR. Section 4.3 describes the results of 
performance analysis.   
 
4.1 Architecture of the RBAC System Using Shibboleth 
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Each site participating in the Grid maintains its own attribute space and Shibboleth 
service. The GridShib software provides two interfaces, one for the Grid services and the 
other for Shibboleth. Shibboleth and GridShib support the pull model in which a target 
resource (a) authenticates a user by using the Grid Security Infrastructure (GSI) of  
Globus Toolkit [14]; (b) determines the address of the appropriate Shibboleth service in 
the process; and  (c) obtains the selected user attributes (that the resource is authorized to 
see) from the Shibboleth service [33].  
 
In our system, as shown in Figure 4.1, the GridShib-Shibboleth interface and the 
Shibboleth service together function as the Policy Information Point (PIP) and Role-
Enablement Authority (REA). A PIP releases attribute values related to the subject (such 
as a user, application or Grid service), the resource and the environment. A REA is 
responsible for assigning roles to users and for enabling roles within a users session [17]. 
Attributes are released in order to authorize users not only based on their entitlements and 
affiliations, but also based on their requested roles, role memberships and user 
credentials. The user credential is formed by an X.509 certificate and the associated 
public/private keys, and is issued by a Certificate Authority (CA) trusted by all entities in 
a Grid [44].  
 
The user submits a request to the OGSA-DAI Data Service, and it retrieves the 
users roles and attributes from the PIP/REA (i.e., GridShib-Shibboleth interface and the 
Shibboleth service) based on the users identity. The GridShib interface for the OGSA-
DAI Data Service functions as the Policy Decision Point (PDP) and returns the 
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authorization decision, such as permit or deny, to the requesting Data Service. The 
request is evaluated based on the attributes released by the PIP/REA and the attributes of 
the local policies maintained by the Data Service. The OGSA-DAI Data Service 
functions as a Policy Administration Point (PAP) at the local level and also as a Policy 
Enforcement Point (PEP). A PAP manages the policies and policy sets, and makes them 
available to the PDP (i.e., the GridShib interface for the OGSA-DAI Data Service). A 
PEP executes the decision of the PDP by either performing or denying the clients 
request. If the decision is permit, the PEP (OGSA-DAI Data Service) sets the security 
context based on the users role, and then a connection is established between the Data 
Service and the requested data resource. The user can then submit queries to the Data 
Service and obtain the results. If the decision is deny, then an error message is returned 
to the user, indicating that the user is not authorized to perform the operation. PIP, PDP, 
PAP, and PEP are terms used in the XACML authorization model [18]. 
 
The attribute space at each site, shown in Figure 4.1, is composed of the attributes 
related to the subject, the resource and the environment; and can also hold the attributes 
pertaining to VO policies. Shibboleth does not store or manage attributes, so a data store, 
such as a Lightweight Directory Access protocol (LDAP) directory or a database, is 
required. We propose the use of OMAR as the PAP at the VO level to administrate the 
portion of the attribute space pertaining to VO policies at the individual sites. This is 
explained in the following section. 
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4.2 Managing VO Policies Using XACML and OMAR 
In order to specify VO policies in the form of VO roles, role hierarchies, privileges 
and constraints, we used the Core and Hierarchical RBAC profile of XACML. We also 
used OMAR for the storage and distributed administration of the VO policies. 
Specification of policies at the VO level allows authorization decisions to be made based 
on the users request and VO policies. In case the user does not possess the required 
privileges, the access can be denied at the VO level. This eliminates mapping and 
connection overheads on the resource providers in case the request is not valid. 
 
4.2.1 eXtensible Access Control Markup Language (XACML) 
XACML is an OASIS standard for describing access control policies uniformly 
across different security domains [18]. XACML defines the following main components 
to represent policies:  
(1) A <PolicySet> contains a set of access control policies or other policy sets.  
(2) A <Policy> represents an access control policy described through a set of rules.  
(3) A <Rule> represents an access rule or permission.  
An XACML <PolicySet>, <Policy> and <Rule> may contain a <Target> element. A 
<Target> element specifies the set of subjects, resources, actions and environments to 
which the <PolicySet>, <Policy> and <Rule> applies [18]. The Core and Hierarchical 
RBAC profile of XACML specification defines how ANSI core and hierarchical RBAC 
standard [19] can be specified in XACML. The Core and Hierarchical profile further 
defines the following components:  
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(1) Permission <PolicySet> (PPS) contains <Policy> elements and <Rules> associated 
with a given role. A PPS may also contain references to other PPSs associated with other 
roles that are junior to the given role, thereby allowing the role to inherit all the 
permissions associated with its junior roles. The <Policy> elements and <Rules> of the 
PPS describe the resources and the permissions on the resources along with any 
conditions on those permissions.  
(2) Role <PolicySet> (RPS) associates a role with the corresponding PPS. Each RPS can 
only refer to a single PPS.  
(3) Role Assignment <Policy> (or <PolicySet>) defines which roles can be enabled or 
assigned to which subjects. 
 
4.2.2 Specifying VO Policies Using XACML 
In this section, we explain how the VO policies can be expressed with the Core and 
Hierarchical RBAC profile of XACML. For example, consider a VO Alpha which could 
be a project undertaken by collaborating organizations. Assume that the VO uses two 
roles: manager and employee. An employee has permission to read the data from a 
database only from 9:00 AM to 5:00 PM. The manager has all the permissions of the 
employee, and additionally has permission to update the database. The manager role is 
therefore senior to the employee role. In multi-domain environments such as VOs, it is 
necessary to manage the attributes across different domains and is often needed to 
aggregate the attributes for making authorization decisions. For this purpose, it is 
necessary to distinguish the VOs attributes from local attributes and also from attributes 
 
 
65
of other VOs. For example, the employee role in the Accounting subgroup of Alpha may 
have different permissions from the employee role in the Accounting subgroup of Beta, 
where Beta is another VO. Hence, when making an authorization decision, it is not only 
important to know the role name employee but also the VO name, either Alpha or Beta.  
In order to manage and identify attributes from different domains, Shibboleth uses 
scoped attributes defined in SAML, which can include the domain name. A scoped 
attribute is a combination of a value and its scope. Scope identifies the domains and sub-
domains in which the values are defined. For example, a scoped attribute may be 
faculty@abcuniv.edu, which identifies the value faculty in the scope abcuniv.edu. 
However, the XACML profile does not support these scoped attribute values for subjects 
such as roles. Mapping SAML to XACML allows the systems using XACML to store 
SAML attributes [62]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
We show how the scoped attribute values can be specified in the RBAC profile of 
XACML to represent role names specific to VOs and VO subgroups. For example, the 
<PolicySet xmlns="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:2.0:policy:schema:os" PolicySetId="RPS:employee:role" 
PolicyCombiningAlgId="&policy-combine;permit-overrides"> 
     <Target> 
         <Subjects> 
            <Subject> 
 <SubjectMatch  MatchId="&function;anyURI-equal"> 
        <AttributeValue DataType="&xml;anyURI" Scope="Alpha.Accounting">&roles;employee</AttributeValue> 
        <SubjectAttributeDesignator AttributeId="&role;" DataType="&xml;anyURI"/> 
 </SubjectMatch> 
            </Subject> 
         </Subjects> 
     </Target> 
     <PolicySetIdReference>PPS:employee:role</PolicySetIdReference> 
</PolicySet> 
Figure 4.2: RPS of the employee role  
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employee role in the Accounting subgroup of Alpha can be represented in XACML as 
shown in Figure 4.2 which illustrates the RPS for this role. The VO and subgroup names 
Alpha.Accounting represent the scope of the employee role. The RPS of the employee 
role references the PPS of the employee role via <PolicySetIdReference>. The PPS of the 
employee role is shown in Figure 4.3, where the resource is represented in a hierarchical 
form. The RPS of the manager role is not shown here, but is similar to the RPS of 
employee except that the role name is manager and the <PolicySetIdReference> 
references the PPS:manager:role shown in Figure 4.4.  
 
In order to support fine-grain authorization for resources, where access control can 
be specified not only for the entire resource (e.g. database) but also for its components 
(e.g. table), the hierarchical resource profile of XACML [53] can be used. This profile 
specifies how XACML provides access control for resources that are organized as a 
hierarchy, such as file systems, XML documents, and databases. For example, for non-
XML data, the profile specifies the URI of the following form: 
<scheme>://<authority>/<pathname> where <pathname> is of the form <root name> 
{/<node name>}, and <scheme> identifies the namespace of the URI and may further 
restrict the syntax and semantics of identifiers using that scheme. The scheme can be a 
protocol such as ftp or http, and a file system resource can have file as the scheme. 
<authority> is typically defined by an Internet-based server or a scheme-specific registry 
of naming authorities, such as DNS. The sequence of <root name> and <node name> 
values should correspond to the components in a hierarchical resource. For example, 
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https://localhost:8484/ogsadai/DataService/Employee indicates the Employee table in 
the database represented by the specified URI.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The PPS of the employee role shown in Figure 4.3 grants the permission to execute 
the SELECT operation (specified within <Action>) on the resource identified by the URI 
https://localhost:8484/ogsadai/DataService/Employee (specified within <Resource>) 
only from 9:00 AM to 5:00 PM (specified within <Condition>). Obviously, not only the 
<PolicySet xmlns="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:2.0:policy:schema:os" PolicySetId="PPS:employee:role" 
PolicyCombiningAlgId="&policy-combine;permit-overrides"> 
  <Policy PolicyId="Permissions:specifically:for:the:employee:role" RuleCombiningAlgId="&rule-combine;permit-overrides"> 
   <Rule RuleId="Permission:to:read:data:from:employee:table" Effect="Permit"> 
     <Target> 
      <Resources>  
       <Resource> 
         <ResourceMatch MatchId="&function;string-equal"> 
             <AttributeValue DataType="&xml;string">https://localhost:8484/ogsadai/DataService/Employee</AttributeValue> 
             <ResourceAttributeDesignator AttributeId="&resource;resource-id" DataType="&xml;string"/> 
         </ResourceMatch> 
        </Resource> 
      </Resources> 
     <Actions> 
          <Action> 
              <ActionMatch MatchId="&function;string-equal"> 
<AttributeValue DataType="&xml;string">select</AttributeValue> 
                  <ActionAttributeDesignator AttributeId="&action;action-id" DataType="&xml;string"/> 
             </ActionMatch> 
         </Action> 
      </Actions> 
    </Target> 
    <Condition> 
        <Apply FunctionId="&function;and"> 
<Apply FunctionId="&function;time-greater-than-or-equal">  
     <Apply FunctionId="&function;time-one-and-only"> 
        <EnvironmentAttributeDesignator AttributeId="&environment;current-time" DataType="&xml;time"/> 
    </Apply> 
    <AttributeValue DataType="&xml;time">9h</AttributeValue> 
</Apply> 
<Apply FunctionId="&function;time-less-than-or-equal"> 
     <Apply FunctionId="&function;time-one-and-only"> 
       <EnvironmentAttributeDesignator AttributeId="&environment;current-time" DataType="&xml;time"/> 
     </Apply> 
     <AttributeValue DataType="&xml;time">17h</AttributeValue> 
</Apply> 
            </Apply> 
     </Condition> 
   </Rule> 
 </Policy> 
</PolicySet> 
</PolicySet> 
Figure 4.3: PPS of the employee role 
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basic database operations, but also complex operations, such as transactions and stored 
procedures, can be permitted. The PPS of the manager role shown in Figure 4.4 grants the 
permission to execute the UPDATE operation on the Employee table. It references the 
PPS of the employee role via <PolicySetIdReference>, thereby inherits all the 
permissions of the employee role. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.2.3 Object, Metadata and Artifacts Registry (OMAR) 
For storing and managing the XACML policies, we make use of the Object, 
Metadata and Artifacts Registry (OMAR) which provides an implementation of the 
OASIS ebXML registry specifications. The ebXML specifications are developed to 
achieve interoperable registries and repositories, with an interface that enables 
<PolicySet xmlns="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:2.0:policy:schema:os" PolicySetId="PPS:manager:role" 
PolicyCombiningAlgId="&policy-combine;permit-overrides"> 
 <Policy PolicyId="Permissions:specifically:for:the:manager:role" RuleCombiningAlgId="&rule-combine;permit-overrides"> 
  <Rule RuleId="Permission:to:update:data:from:employee:table" Effect="Permit"> 
      <Target> 
        <Resources>  
          <Resource> 
            <ResourceMatch MatchId="&function;string-equal"> 
             <AttributeValue DataType="&xml;string">https://localhost:8484/ogsadai/DataService/Employee</AttributeValue> 
             <ResourceAttributeDesignator AttributeId="&resource;resource-id" DataType="&xml;string"/> 
           </ResourceMatch> 
          </Resource> 
      </Resources> 
     <Actions> 
          <Action> 
<ActionMatch MatchId="&function;string-equal"> 
<AttributeValue DataType="&xml;string">update</AttributeValue> 
<ActionAttributeDesignator AttributeId="&action;action-id" DataType="&xml;string"/> 
</ActionMatch> 
         </Action> 
       <Actions> 
      </Target> 
    </Rule> 
   </Policy> 
   <PolicySetIdReference>PPS:employee:role</PolicySetIdReference> 
</PolicySet> 
Figure 4.4: PPS of the manager role 
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submission, query and retrieval of the registry and repository contents [51]. An ebXML 
registry is an information system that securely manages any content type and the 
standardized metadata that describes the content. It also provides a set of services for the 
sharing of its content and metadata between organizational entities in a federated 
environment [54].  
OMAR stores data in a repository and stores the associated metadata as registry 
objects [54]. The relationship between the registry objects is represented by an 
association object. OMAR allows many-to-many associations between the registry 
objects. OMAR uses an object, called slot, to add attributes dynamically to registry 
objects.  
 
OMAR stores the XACML policies in their entirety as repository items and 
classifies them as either XACML Policy object or XACML PolicySet object. However, 
as policies are stored in their entirety, any updates in policies become difficult especially 
for VOs whose policies are complex and tend to change dynamically. To solve this 
problem, we propose to split each policy into components and store them as different 
objects, as described below. 
 
4.2.4 Managing the RBAC Policies in XACML Using OMAR 
OMAR allows the creation of new objects and their classification. The information 
pertaining to these objects is stored in a relational database. A Role <PolicySet> (RPS) is 
represented in XACML as shown in Figure 4.5(a). In OMAR, we represent a 
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<PolicySet> as an XACML PolicySet object with the <PolicySetId> attribute value used 
as the objects name. The other attributes of the <PolicySet> are represented as slots. For 
the other components, such as <Target> and <Subjects>, we create new objects, as shown 
in Figure 4.5(c). 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The role name is stored as a String object. To represent the relationship between 
the various components, we use the associations, such as Contains, which are defined 
by OMAR. In addition, we create a new association PolicySetIdReference to represent 
the association between a Role <PolicySet> and a Permission <PolicySet> (PPS). The 
Id .. Association 
Type 
sourceId TargetId 
234  Contains 1273123 3874583 
345  Contains 3874583 3243454 
456  PolicySetId 
Reference 
1273123 1253123 
Figure 4.5: A part of the employee RPS in XACML and corresponding storage in OMAR 
 (a) Role <PolicySet> in XACML  
<PolicySet 
xmlns="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:2.0:policy:schema:os" 
PolicySetId="RPS:employee:role" 
PolicyCombiningAlgId="&policy-combine;permit-
overrides"> 
     <Target> 
       <Subjects> 
         .. &roles;employee  
     </Subjects> 
   </Target> 
<PolicySetIdReference> 
PPS:employee:role 
</PolicySetIdReference> 
</PolicySet> 
Id:1273123 
ObjectType: PolicySet 
Name:RPS:employee:role 
Slots:  
     Name: PolicyCombiningAlgId 
     Value: &policy-combine;permit-overrides 
Id:3874583 
ObjectType: Target 
Id: 3243454 
ObjectType: Subjects 
Id: 7234263 
ObjectType: String 
Name:&roles;employee 
Id: 234 
ObjectType: Association 
AssociationType: Contains 
Id: 345 
ObjectType: Association 
AssociationType: Contains 
PPS 
(b) Associations between objects in OMAR 
(c) Role <PolicySet> stored as objects in OMAR  
Id: 456 
ObjectType: Association 
AssociationType:PolicySetIdReference 
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associations between the various objects are captured in a relational table as shown in 
Figure 4.5(b). For example, the association between a PolicySet object and a Target 
object is stored as a tuple with Id 234. A representation of a PPS in XACML and it 
corresponding storage in OMAR are shown in Figure 4.6. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.6: A part of the employee PPS in XACML and corresponding storage in OMAR 
Id:1253123 
ObjectType: PolicySet 
Name:PPS:employee:role 
Slots:  
     Name: PolicyCombiningAlgId 
     Value: &policy-combine;permit-overrides 
Id:5675677 
ObjectType: Target 
Id: 4356575 
ObjectType: String 
Name: resource2 
Id: 456 
ObjectType: Association 
AssociationType:Contains 
Id: 2398474 
ObjectType: Policy 
Name: Permissions:specifically:for:the:employee:role 
Slots: 
      Name: RuleCombiningAlgId 
      Value: &rule-combine;permit-overrides 
Id: 878 
ObjectType: Association 
AssociationType: Contains
Id: 256 
ObjectType: Association 
AssociationType:Contains 
Id:2837429 
ObjectType: Rule 
Name:Permission:to:perform:action2:on:resource2 
Slots:  
     Name: Effect 
     Value: permit 
Id: 565 
ObjectType: Association 
AssociationType:Contains 
Id:789 
ObjectType: Association 
AssociationType: Contains 
Id: 3256444 
ObjectType: Actions
Id: 4565675 
ObjectType: String 
Name: action2 
Id: 3256444 
ObjectType: Resources 
RPS 
<PolicySet xmlns="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:2.0:policy:schema:os" PolicySetId="PPS:employee:role" 
PolicyCombiningAlgId="&policy-combine;permit-overrides"> 
  <Policy PolicyId="Permissions:specifically:for:the:employee:role" RuleCombiningAlgId="&rule-combine;permit-overrides">
  <Rule RuleId="Permission:to:perform:action2:on:resource2" Effect="Permit"> 
      <Target> 
           <Resources>.resource2 </Resources> 
           <Actions>action2 </Actions> 
        </Target> 
      </Rule> 
    </Policy> 
</PolicySet> 
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OMAR supports the federation of registries by defining a federation object and the 
association between the registry objects and the federation object. Federation allows 
multiple registries to link together seamlessly and appear as a single logical registry, 
while retaining local autonomy and security. Thus, XACML-based policies can be stored 
and managed across multiple sites in the Grid, while each site maintains its own registry 
and Shibboleth service. Hence, there is less potential for bottlenecks and no single point 
of failure in the system as authorization queries are distributed among the Shibboleth 
services. OMAR provides a Java browser user interface and a Web user interface for 
managing the registry objects and repository items. It also provides an API for creating 
new objects and associations. The XACML-based policies can be easily managed 
through this API since all the policy information is stored in relational databases.  Figure 
4.7 shows the policy objects in Figures 4.5 and 4.6 in a Java browser, and Figure 4.8 
shows how the attributes and their values of the PolicySet object in Figure 4.6 are stored 
using slots in OMAR. 
 
4.2.5 User-Role Assignments 
The RBAC profile of XACML allows the specification of constraints on specific 
user-role assignments through the Role Assignment <Policy>/<PolicySet>, but it does 
not maintain the roles assigned to each user. The user-role assignments are typically 
made by an identity provider at each site by adding the roles to a users attribute list. The 
identity provider can release the attributes of the users to the resource providers so that 
access control decisions can be made.  
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Figure 4.7: Policy objects of the employee role and their associations stored in OMAR
Figure 4.8: Details of the PPS:employee:role object in Figure 4.6 as stored in OMAR
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In a VO, the user attributes may have to be managed across multiple sites, and in 
that case a portion of the attribute space at each of those sites should be delegated to the 
VO. This can be supported by Signet [55] which is a privilege management system being 
developed by a working group of the Internet2 Middleware Initiative for the distributed 
administration of privileges. By interfacing Signet to the Shibboleth and enabling the user 
access through GridShib, we can delegate the management of a portion of an attribute 
space at a site [33].  
 
The VO can then make the role assignments at each site for the users who are VO 
members. However, the Grid identity of the user has to be mapped to a local identity in 
order to retrieve the attributes of the user from the attribute space of the site. The 
GridShib interface for Shibboleth handles this mapping by maintaining a text file that 
maps the Grid identity of a user to a local identity. However, this method is not scalable 
as the mapping information should be maintained for each user. In our system, roles are 
assigned to the users Grid identity, and it can be done within OMAR itself. A registry 
object is created for each user, and it contains the users Grid identity. The HasMember 
association is specified between the RPS object of the role and the user object as shown 
in Figure 4.7, thus allowing the REA in our system to enable the users role. 
 
Moreover, since Shibboleth can be interfaced to local data stores, like LDAP 
directories and databases, providing user attributes, the VO can delegate the user-role 
assignments to individual sites. The sites can assign certain VO roles to local users based 
on their attributes. For example, only the employees of a particular department can be 
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given a membership on the role VO-guest. The REA in our system can also make user-
role assignments dynamically. For example, students enrolled in a particular course can 
be given a membership on the role VO-student, based on their user attributes in the local 
data stores and the Role Assignment <Policy>/<PolicySet> registry objects. 
 
4.2.6 Administration of RBAC Policies and Dynamic 
Delegation of Rights with OMAR 
One of the key features of RBAC is the ability to manage itself through 
administrative roles and permissions [10]. Users in administrative roles can create roles 
and role hierarchies; make user-role and permission-role assignments; and specify 
constraints. Furthermore, they can assign administration privileges to other users. This 
administration feature of RBAC is not directly addressed by the RBAC profile of 
XACML, but can be easily realized through OMAR. 
 
A user with OMAR registry administration privileges can create policy objects and 
determine how other registry users can access them through the Access Control Policy 
(ACP) file. In particular, that user can create a registry role (by creating policy objects) 
and assign privileges for creating/accessing certain registry objects to that role. A registry 
role is an OMAR component similar to a database role. The user who creates a registry 
role can also grant memberships on that registry role to other registry users. For example, 
a VO administrator having OMAR registry administration privileges can create a new 
registry role and assign (to that role) only the privilege to create users in VO employee 
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role. The VO administrator can then assign a VO manager to the new registry role (after 
creating a registry account for the VO manager). Then, the VO manager can create new 
users in VO employee role by himself/herself. 
 
The RBAC profile of XACML does not address dynamic delegation of rights, 
which is important in Grids. A user should be able to dynamically delegate his/her rights 
to other users, applications and Grid services without administrative intervention. For 
example, a VO supervisor with access rights to a new resource may wish to delegate 
his/her rights to applications run by certain users. The Grid Security Infrastructure (GSI) 
of the Globus Toolkit achieves such delegation through the use of temporary proxy 
credentials which are generated based on user credentials [44]. However, it does not 
allow the specification of constraints on the delegation of rights.  For example, a VO 
supervisor may be allowed to delegate his/her rights only to programmers, but not to 
operators. Such constrained dynamic delegation can be easily achieved with OMAR. The 
VO supervisor can be assigned to a registry role that allows him/her to only create policy 
objects representing a new VO role, but not to create user objects. The VO supervisor can 
also be allowed to create associations only between the PPS object of the new VO role 
and the PPS object of the VO supervisor role. This allows the delegation of privileges 
from the supervisor role to the new VO role. Furthermore, the VO supervisor can be 
allowed to create associations only between the RPS of the new VO role and the user 
objects associated with the RPS of the VO programmer role. This allows only VO 
programmers to be assigned to the new VO role. Thus, the VO supervisor can delegate its 
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own privileges only to VO programmers, whose applications can then access the new 
resource as soon as the new VO role is enabled by the REA.  
 
4.3 Performance Analysis 
We have implemented the proposed RBAC system and integrated it with OGSA-
DAI. We have configured the server-side of OGSA-DAI to use Shibboleth through 
GridShib. The OGSA-DAI server has been modified to obtain the users attributes from 
the Shibboleth service, verify them against the local policy, and map the users VO role 
to a local role by using the role-map file. The role-map file has been extended to include 
the mapping from a VO role to a local role. Furthermore, the resource providers can grant 
or refuse the access requests of specific users by maintaining their authorization 
information separately in the Access Control List (ACL) maintained by the OGSA-DAI 
server. This enables the resource providers to have the ultimate authority over their 
resources. The Shibboleth service has been modified to use a custom data connector for 
the retrieval of the users attributes based on his/her Grid identity from OMAR. 
 
The overheads incurred with our RBAC system are compared with those of the 
existing authorization infrastructure of OGSA-DAI. In our system, OGSA-DAI WSRF 
Release 2.0 was deployed in the Globus Toolkit 4.0.1 container running on a Linux 
machine with a 2.6 GHz Intel Pentium IV processor and 1 GB of RAM. Shibboleth identity 
provider (IdP) 1.3c was configured to run on SSL-enabled Apache 2.2.0 and Tomcat 5.0.28 
servers. We used OMAR 3.0 beta 1 as the repository for storing the XACML policies. The 
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littleblackbook MySQL database table distributed with OGSA-DAI was used as a test 
database, and it contains 10,000 tuples. The perform document consisting of a request for a 
single tuple was used for the purpose of analysis. 
 
4.3.1 Profiling Details 
A Java method System.currentTimeMillis() is used to get the current system time in 
milliseconds. Also, for the server-side analysis, the Apache Log4j logger, which logs 
time to a log file in milliseconds, is used. For more accuracy, the tomcat, apache and 
Globus toolkit containers are shutdown and restarted before each client request, in order 
to minimize the caching effects within Globus Toolkit, OGSA-DAI and Shibboleth 
server. The main change from the original configuration of OGSA-DAI is the way 
authorization is performed at the server-side. Hence, only the security aspects of the 
client and the server are profiled and analyzed.  
 
Globus Toolkit uses Grid Security Infrastructure (GSI) which allows two levels of 
security: transport-level and message-level. In the transport-level security, the complete 
communication channel between the client and server is encrypted. In the message-level 
security, only the message is encrypted, so it has the flexibility that the message can be 
transmitted over any transport. The message-level security offers more features than the 
transport-level security, but it takes more time. The performance is analyzed based on 
these different levels of security established between the client and the server as shown 
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below. For each of these levels, we recorded the times taken with and without using 
Shibboleth. 
1) MLS: Enforces GSI Secure Conversation between the client and the server of 
OGSA-DAI with message-level security and privacy.  
2) TLS: Enforces GSI Secure Conversation between the client and the server of 
OGSA-DAI with transport-level security and privacy. 
3) None: Does not provide a secure conversation between the client and the server of 
OGSA-DAI and does not enforce any security. 
 
4.3.2 Client-Side Security 
A call is made to each of the above OGSA-DAI Data Services with and without 
using Shibboleth. In case of using Shibboleth, additional overhead exists for contacting 
the Shibboleth service, retrieving user attributes, and verifying the validity of the attribute 
assertions. The getversion method of the Data Service returns the version of OGSA-DAI 
used. The listResources method of the Data Service returns the list of resources hosted by 
the Data Service. The perform method of the Data Service takes the perform document, 
which contains the query, and returns the result to the client.  
 
GSI Secure Conversation requires a security context to be established between 
the client and the server. The overheads incurred in setting up this security context are 
analyzed based on the following: 
1. A call made to manage the communication with the configurable Data Service.  
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2. Calls to the getversion, listResources and perform methods. 
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The corresponding times are shown in Figure 4.9, and as observed, the time for 
creating the proxy which manages the communication with the configurable data service 
is almost the same. This process involves connecting to the service at the given URL, 
retrieving its information, and determining the specification of web services used for the 
OGSA-DAI distribution. As this step does not require any authorization, it takes almost 
the same time regardless of the security enforced by the Data Service. The calls to the 
getversion, listResources and perform take longer when Shibboleth is used because the 
server has to contact it, retrieve the user information, and verify whether the user is 
authorized to perform the requested operation. In case of None, it takes less time because 
there is no such authorization overhead.  
 
Figure 4.9: Client-Side Security 
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The times for executing the getversion method are longer compared with other 
methods, because it is the first call made by the client and takes time to retrieve the user 
attributes from the Shibboleth service. The later calls take less time as they may require 
the same attributes that are obtained previously and cached by the GridShib interface for 
the Data Service. 
 
4.3.3 Server-Side Security 
The analysis made on the server-side is based on the following: 
1. Times taken for retrieving user attributes from the Shibboleth service during the 
getVersion, listResources and perform method calls.  
2. Time to establish the JDBC connection.  
3. A call to the getSecurityContext method which returns the security related information. 
 
Figure 4.10 shows the times taken for retrieving the attribute information during 
the getVersion, listResources and perform method calls. The GridShib interface for the 
Data Service can cache received attributes from call to call, which allows multiple 
methods to be executed by the same client without making repeated callouts to the 
attribute authority. Hence, the attribute retrieval from Shibboleth during the getVersion 
method call involves contacting the attribute authority and takes longer time than 
subsequent method calls which can use the cached user attributes. When Shibboleth is not 
used, this overhead is not incurred as attribute retrieval is not performed. 
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Figure 4.11 shows the time taken for setting up the database connection between 
the server and the resource. As no authorization is required, this step takes almost the 
same time regardless of the security enforced by the Data Service. Figure 4.12 shows the 
time taken for obtaining the security related information on the server-side. In this step, 
obtaining the user credential and extracting the identity of the user can be done only 
when the GSI Secure Conversation is used. In case of None, the overhead is bigger 
Figure 4.10: Server-Side Security 
Figure 4.11: Database Connection 
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because of the unsuccessful attempts made to retrieve the credential and the identity of 
the user. 
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In summary, on the client-side and server-side, additional overheads exist when 
setting up the security context because the server contacts the Shibboleth service, 
retrieves user attributes, and verifies the validity of the attribute assertions in order to 
authorize the client. The client can execute multiple methods without repeated callouts 
being made to the attribute authority by the server. This is because the GridShib interface 
for the Data Service can cache received attributes and those same attributes may be 
required for subsequent method calls. On the server-side, no additional overheads are 
incurred in the credential extraction process and setting up of the database connection, as 
no authorization is required during these steps. The overheads in setting up the security 
context are quite acceptable when we consider the benefits of our method, such as 
scalability in managing VO policies and reduced administration overheads for resource 
Figure 4.12:  Retrieval of Security Context 
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providers. For multiple large queries, this overhead is almost negligible compared to the 
execution time of the perform document. 
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Chapter 5 
 
Conclusions  
 
In this research, we enhanced the role-based access control (RBAC) mechanism of 
OGSA-DAI by using (1) the Community Authorization Service (CAS), and (2) the   
Shibboleth, GridShib, XACML and OMAR, so that users are granted memberships 
statically and dynamically on virtual organization (VO) roles for Grid database services. 
Interoperability between different security mechanisms, dynamic delegation of rights, 
privacy protection, and the centralized and distributed management of privileges are 
supported. The resource providers need to maintain only the mapping information from 
VO roles to local database roles and the local policy information; thus, the number of 
entries to be managed in the role-map file is reduced dramatically compared to the case 
of using the identity-based mapping. The specification of policies at the VO level 
eliminates unnecessary authentication, mapping and connections by denying invalid 
requests at the VO level itself. When users join/leave a VO, the resource providers do not 
need to add/remove their information individually in the role-map files because we can 
just grant/revoke their memberships on VO roles. Furthermore, the resource providers 
can grant or refuse the access requests of specific users by maintaining their authorization 
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information separately in the role-map files. This enables the resource providers to have 
the ultimate authority over their resources.  
 
Our performance analysis shows that the proposed RBAC systems incur a small 
overhead in setting up the security context between the client and server. However, this 
overhead is quite acceptable when we consider the benefits of our system, such as the 
scalability in terms of the number of users and VOs and reduced administration 
overheads of resource providers. For multiple large queries, this overhead is almost 
negligible compared to the execution time of the perform document. 
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